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MITOCHONDRIAL DNA TRANSFER. SOME REFLECTIONS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 
ABSTRACT: Recent medical advances and subsequent law reform in the United King-
dom have reignited debate about the ethics of mitochondrial DNA donation and 
transfer. The potential personal and societal benefits of permitting such practices 
must be considered against the ethical issues raised by them. It is argued that each 
objection is defeasible, assuming that safety and efficacy issues can be resolved. A 
brief description of the new provisions in the UK is provided. 
KEYWORDS: Mitochondrial DNA donation and transfer; reproductive liberty; genetic 
identity; law reform 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. Some Ethical Considerations. – 3. The UK Position. – 4. Conclusion. 
1. Introduction 
s genetic medicine continues to advance, therapeutic developments, while sometimes 
lagging behind our capacity to identify genetic problems, nonetheless become increasing-
ly feasible. One area of increasing contemporary relevance relates to the human toll gen-
erated by disease that can be directly linked to mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA). Mitochondria «are small 
structures present in cells that produce much of the energy required by the cell. They contain a small 
amount of DNA that is inherited exclusively from the mother through the mitochondria present in 
her eggs. Mutations in this mitochondrial DNA….can cause a range of rare but serious diseases, which 
can be fatal»1. While relatively rare, it is still estimated that around 3,500 people in the United King-
dom are affected by mitochondrial disease2. Equally, it has been said that «[a]round 1 in 6500 chil-
dren is thought to develop a serious mitochondrial disorder. There is no cure and our current treat-
ments only focus on managing the symptoms»3. 
                                                          
 Emeritus Professor of Law and Ethics in Medicine, University of Glasgow. Invited contribution. 
1 Third scientific review of the safety and efficacy of methods to avoid mitochondrial disease through assisted 
conception: 2014 update. Report provided to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), June 
2014, p. 3. 
2
 K. ELVIDGE, Why we should back a law change to allow mitochondrial transfer into the clinic, in BioNews 644, 
available at http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_124860.asp (accessed 28/04/2015). 
3
 Wellcome Trust (London), Q&A: Mitochondrial donation, available at 
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@policy_communications/documents/web_docum
ent/wtp057782.pdf (accessed 28/04/2015). 
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While relatively small numbers may be involved, the severity of mitochondrial disease and the hu-
man suffering associated with it means that therapeutic progress has the capacity to reduce the 
overall costs – both human and financial – of mere management of symptoms, where that is even 
possible. In 2008, scientists at the University of Newcastle announced a potential breakthrough that 
holds out the possibility that mitochondrial disease could become a thing of the past. 
There are two different techniques that could ensure that in the future, where intending parents are 
aware of the potential that the mother may pass on faulty mtDNA to her offspring, they can, in con-
junction with the use of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) choose to avoid this. Essentially, the techniques are 
designed to replace the faulty mtDNA by using mitochondria from an unaffected donor to replace 
the mtDNA of the woman intending to become pregnant. These techniques are known as maternal 
spindle transfer and pronuclear transfer. The former, as the Wellcome Trust explains: 
….involves removing the nuclear DNA (which amounts to 99.9% of the total cell DNA) from the 
donor egg, leaving the part of the cell containing the healthy mitochondria. The nuclear DNA 
from the mother’s egg is then inserted into this cell. The healthy egg is fertilised and is then 
implanted into the mother’s uterus in the same way IVF is carried out already4. 
The latter, «involves fertilising the mother’s egg with the father’s sperm first and then transferring 
the nuclear DNA to the donor egg containing healthy mitochondria, which has had its nuclear DNA 
removed. The healthy fertilised egg is then implanted into the mother’s uterus in the same way as in 
maternal spindle transfer»5. It should be noted here that pronuclear transfer is arguably the more 
controversial of these options, given that it involves the creation, and potential destruction of em-
bryos. For some, this is sufficiently ethically troubling that no further debate is necessary. However, 
in most (albeit not all) countries where IVF is permitted, “spare” embryos – that it those not des-
tined, for whatever reason, for implantation – will, after a period of time, be destroyed, so this is not 
novel to pronuclear transfer. The UK legislation also permits the creation of embryos specifically for 
research, and these too will inevitably be destroyed6. 
While positive results have been obtained in animal experiments in the laboratory, the possible suc-
cessful translation of either of these techniques into human medical practice has proved to be, as 
one commentator puts it, «immediately controversial»7. Few advances in reproductive medicine 
have proved to be anything else. Forty years ago, debate raged about the ethics – and even the pro-
priety – of IVF. Now, it is widely accepted as essentially standard medical practice, albeit often con-
trolled by a legislative framework which builds in procedural safeguards. Despite the promise of 
these new techniques, it is unsurprising that a fierce debate has been generated, with polarised posi-
                                                          
4
 Wellcome Trust (London), Q&A: Mitochondrial donation, available at: 
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@policy_communications/documents/web_docum
ent/wtp057782.pdf (accessed 28/04/2015), para 7. 
5
 Wellcome Trust, op cit. 
6
 It is worth noting that the UK did not sign up to the Council of Europe’s Convention for the protection of 
human rights and dignity of the human being with regard to the application of biology and medicine: 
convention on human rights and biomedicine (1997) precisely because it prohibits the creation of embryos for 
research. The Convention is available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/164.htm 
(accessed on 23/04/2015). 
7
 K. ELVIDGE, op. cit. 
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tions adopted on each side. Interestingly, there are clear echoes of the very same debate that sur-
rounded IVF in its early days, and by and large those opposing the introduction of these techniques 
tend to be those who also argued against many of the other advances in reproductive medicine. This 
is not to malign or denigrate their position, but rather to show how fundamental moral or ethical 
concerns do not disappear simply because we have become more tolerant of some innovations. 
Broadly, the concerns expressed by those who either oppose the further development of these tech-
niques, or who urge extreme caution, involve matters of both a practical and a philosophical type. 
Practically, there are concerns about the safety of the procedures. Manifestly, were there risks to the 
future child as a result of the application of these techniques then a powerful argument could be 
made that they should not be attempted. It could, and possibly should, be argued that we have an 
obligation not deliberately or knowingly to generate such a risk, potentially causing more harm to fu-
ture children than their mitochondrial disease would. However, this position makes some assump-
tions that are susceptible of challenge. First, and arguably convincingly, a number of reviews – includ-
ing one highly commended series of reports from the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(HFEA)8 concluded that «[a]t each review, the panel has reached a view that the evidence it has seen 
does not suggest that these techniques are unsafe. That remains the panel’s current view»9. Second, 
even if some level of risk were identified, it would be necessary to balance that against the certainty 
of the suffering caused by mitochondrial diseases which «are progressive and can cause a wide spec-
trum of severe health problems including heart and other major organ failures, stroke, dementia, 
blindness, deafness and premature death»10. 
2. Some Ethical Considerations 
At a more philosophical level, concern relates to the extent to which manipulating DNA may have an 
effect on the born child’s identity. The assumption here is that, because additional genetic material 
will be present in the child, this will affect the child in ways that prima facie threaten his or her iden-
tity. Murdoch, however, argues that while substitution of faulty by healthy mitochondrial DNA will 
affect a future child’s health (beneficially), this will not «influence a person’s characteristics»11. Ra-
ther, a different child is born – one without disease. An argument along similar lines concerns what is 
known as denial of an “open future”. On this argument, by deliberately manipulating the child’s ge-
netic makeup we are denying in some way the opportunity for that child to make free, authentic 
choices in the future. Of course, the same could be said of any selection procedure – whether it is as 
simple as a choice of mate to co-parent a child, or the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) 
                                                          
8
 The statutory body which regulates assisted reproduction in the United Kingdom, established by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
9
 Third scientific review of the safety and efficacy of methods to avoid mitochondrial disease through assisted 
conception: 2014 update: Report provided to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), June 
2014, p. 4. 
10
 Novel techniques for the prevention of mitochondrial DNA disorders: an ethical review, London, Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2012, p. xv. 
11
 A. MURDOCH, IVF and the prevention of mitochondrial DNA disease: the moral issues, in Bionews 605, available 
at http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_01423.asp (accessed 28/04/2015). 
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to select healthy embryos for implantation. In addition, as Bredenoord, Dondorp, Pennings and De 
Wert argue, «[a]s health is a sine qua non for many plans in life, modification of the mtDNA would es-
tablish a more open future»12. 
In a related concern, it is argued that the introduction of a third party’s genetic make-up into the fu-
ture child is likely to be confusing for the child; effectively, it is said, we are creating 3-parent fami-
lies. Several points can be made about this concern. First, and although for some people knowledge 
of one’s genetic inheritance is a matter of great concern, the amount of “foreign” DNA introduced is 
tiny and scarcely likely to cause confusion. Only about 0.1% of the child’s DNA would come from the 
donor, and «these genes would only be involved in energy production via the mitochondria, and 
nothing else»13. In any event, it is not solely techniques like this that can introduce third party DNA. 
As has been said, «[c]omparisons have been made between the genetic significance of donated mi-
tochondria on a person’s identity to that of receiving a kidney or bone marrow transplant»14. 
One further aspect of this objection relates to the fact that, as some newspaper headlines would 
have it, use of the procedures would result in the creation of «3-parent families». However, in a 
world in which the nuclear family is no longer necessarily the norm – with same sex couples using 
donated gametes to build families, for example – even if the mitochondrial donor actually made a 
major contribution to the child’s DNA (which we have already seen is not the case) – the law is well-
equipped to negotiate the question of parentage even where much more of a genetic contribution is 
made. 
As ever, questions about consent are also raised. Given the uncertainty – particularly in the early 
days of human trials – as to the safety and/or efficacy of the new techniques, is it possible that a 
true, informed consent could actually be given? Obviously, were uncertainty of outcome a barrier to 
the provision of a legally valid consent, then ex hypothesi clinical research would grind to a halt; a 
conclusion that is manifestly not only a threat to medical advance, but counter-intuitive for those 
who defend an individual’s right to make authentic choices for themselves. Of course, taking this ar-
gument a little further, it might be argued that while adult human beings have the right to make de-
cisions for themselves, even if they are harmed as a result, they do not have a similar right to make 
such decisions on behalf of someone else – in this case, their prospective child. Leaving aside the 
complex question as to whether or not it makes sense to talk about non-conceived future children as 
having rights or interests worthy of protecting (and some would argue that they do), manifestly par-
ents of born children make innumerable decisions on their behalves on a daily basis, some of which 
(however inadvertently) cause harm, yet we do not – except in extreme circumstances – remove de-
cision-making authority from them. 
Perhaps inevitably, when reproductive medicine is combined with genetic science, the spectre of eu-
genics raises its ugly head. For example, opponents of PGD argue that “preferring” healthy to affect-
ed embryos is a form of negative eugenics and will affect not only the social order but also the self-
                                                          
12
 A.L. BREDENOORD, W. DONDORP, G. PENNINGS, G. DE WERT, Ethics of modifying the mitochondrial genome, in J. 
Med. Ethics, 2011, 37, 97-100, at p. 100. 
13
 K. ELVIDGE, op. cit. 
14
 Ethical issues of new techniques to avoid mitochondrial disease, Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority, ELAC (06/11)1, June 8 2011, para 6.1. 
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esteem and sense of worth of those who live with genetic difficulties. To take the latter example first, 
this is a view often posited by some of those in the disability rights lobby who fear that making it 
possible to screen out those who would otherwise be born with a genetic predisposition to or actual 
disability both demeans the entire disabled population and adds further stigmatisation to the already 
existing lack of concern and compassion. This is an argument not easy to dismiss, based as it is in the 
reality that people with disabilities are often unequally treated and sometimes ignored when im-
portant social decisions are made. For example, without legislation to enforce it, how many archi-
tects would design buildings which are user-friendly for wheelchair users? However, while it is de-
plorable that people with disabilities may be treated as “second class” citizens, this does not neces-
sarily translate into an argument to prevent intending parents from making decisions that avoid suf-
fering for future children and exercising their reproductive autonomy. Interestingly while it is often 
the case that spokespersons for the disability community condemn selection based on disability, 
Shakespeare, one of the disability rights lobby’s most expert and thoughtful commentators, accepts 
that «there are reasons to want to prevent the birth of a child affected by impairment which do not 
reflect discrimination against disabled people….»15. 
On the former point, the impact of selection on the “social order” is arguably a hangover from the 
negative eugenics most dreadfully espoused by Nazi Germany, but also endorsed in a more limited 
version by countries such as the USA and others16. It must, however, be borne in mind that one of 
the most offensive aspects of (negative) eugenic policies was that it was mandated state policy; not 
the free choice of individuals to make authentic decisions. In no way can individuals exercising free 
reproductive choices be compared to the policies of hatred and genocide. 
This leads in this necessarily brief tour of some of the ethical issues raised by this medical advance to 
one important consideration; namely, that of reproductive liberty. There are few values of more im-
portance to individuals and couples than the right to make free and authentic decisions about repro-
duction. In the 20th Century in particular, this became an issue of overwhelming concern for many, 
given not only the egregious compulsory sterilisation programmes in Nazi Germany, but also pro-
grammes conducted on a lesser scale in countries such as the United States where, in authorising the 
compulsory sterilisation of one Carrie Buck, Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes famously remarked that 
«three generations of imbeciles are enough»17. Recognition of the importance of choice in human 
reproduction is a direct challenge to eugenic or discriminatory policies and is, therefore, important 
not just for individuals but also for the moral tone of society as a whole. Naturally, no right is abso-
lute and the claims made for reproductive liberty do not require supporting any choice; rather, they 
mandate the default position as being liberty. Evidence of harm may negate the presumption in fa-
vour of freedom, but absent that we should be as free as possible to fulfil our reproductive aspira-
tions whether they be to reproduce or not to do so. Permitting mtDNA donation and transfer would 
                                                          
15
 T. SHAKESPEARE, “Losing the plot?” Medical and Activist Discourses of Contemporary Genetics and Disability, in 
Sociology of Health and Illness, 1999, 21(5), 681. For further discussion of this issue, see S.A.M. MCLEAN, L. 
WILLIAMSON, Impairment and Disability: Law and Ethics at the Beginning and End of Life, Abingdon, 2007. 
16
 For a more in-depth discussion of reproductive liberty see S.A.M. MCLEAN, Modern Dilemmas: Choosing 
Children, Edinburgh, 2006. 
17
 Buck v Bell 274 US 200 (1927), at p. 207. 
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support reproductive liberty in that this «would offer women who carry such disorders, or who are 
affected by them, the chance to have healthy children who are also genetically related to them»18. 
There are potentially endless arguments surrounding the novel techniques proposed to eradicate the 
suffering caused by the transmission of faulty mtDNA, but perhaps the one that differentiates this 
debate from those that arise in other areas of reproductive medicine concerns the fact that the 
treatment can be defined as involving germ-line rather than somatic therapy. While somatic treat-
ment is designed to target a particular symptom without modifying the individual’s DNA, germ-line 
therapy «introduces new genetic material into the gametes. The genetic change would be repro-
duced in each cell of the developing individual as well as in each subsequent generation»19. 
It is the fact that the individual’s DNA would be modified and that this modification would be present 
for all future descendants that raises the major concern about the proposed techniques. Either of the 
two methods referred to earlier would result in permanent genetic modification. For the moment, 
we do not fully know or understand what the consequences of this would be. Might we, for example, 
lose something beneficial by wiping out certain genetic traits? For example, it is known that people 
with Tay-Sachs have an inherently higher resistance to malaria. What if similar protections are pro-
vided by otherwise harmful genes? As with many medical advances, of course, the answer to this 
question will only become clear after use and experience.  
However, we must also balance the possible risk of losing beneficial protection from something else 
with the known and often acute harms caused by mitochondrial disease. As the Wellcome Trust has 
said: 
It is never possible to answer every safety question before new medical procedures are used in 
people, but the scientific evidence suggests that any risks of mitochondrial donation are pro-
portionate to the severity of mitochondrial disease and the well-recognised significant risk that 
children will continue to be born who will die in infancy if these techniques are not used20. 
Nonetheless, germ-line treatment has been and remains controversial if not outright banned. For ex-
ample, The Council of Europe’s Convention for the protection of human rights and dignity of the hu-
man being with regard to the application of biology and medicine: convention on human rights and 
biomedicine (1997) states at Art.13: «An intervention seeking to modify the human genome may on-
ly be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to intro-
duce any modification in the genome of any descendants»21. Although this Convention has been rati-
fied by many European jurisdictions, the UK is not a signatory which, in light of what has recently 
taken place in the UK, is of more than passing interest. 
UNESCO’s International Bioethics Committee also disapproves of what it calls predetermining the 
genes of future children, calling in aid the principle of intergenerational justice, saying that genetic 
                                                          
18
 Nuffield Report, op. cit., at p. 52, para 4.1. 
19
 D.S. RUBENSTEIN, D.C. THOMASMA, E.A. SCHON, M.J. ZINAMAN, Germ-Line Therapy to Cure Mitochondrial Disease: 
Protocol and Ethics of In Vitro Ovum Nuclear Transplantation, in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 
1995, 4, 316-339, at p. 317. 
20
 Wellcome Trust, loc. cit. 
21
 Available at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/164.htm (accessed on 23/04/2015). 
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technologies should not «become instruments for intergenerational tyranny»22. Indeed, the Commit-
tee believed that «the most elementary prudence requires that germ-line intervention should not be 
undertaken on the basis of the “precautionary principle”»23. However, both science and, to an ex-
tent, evidence have changed since this recommendation was made, coming as it did at a time when 
research into the possibility of germ-line interventions was at best in its infancy. Since then, we must 
ask whether the precautionary principle should or does apply. Successful animal experiments seem 
to demonstrate both the likely safety and efficacy of the procedures under consideration here. In-
deed, some would argue that «….the fact that nuclear transfer with the aim of preventing the trans-
mission of mtDNA disease would involve germ-line modification cannot convincingly be construed as 
a categorical moral objection against the possible use of this technology»24. 
Times and attitudes move on. In its survey of public attitudes to mtDNA transfer, the HFEA found 
that there was broad public support for its carefully regulated use. Nor is the United Kingdom alone 
in re-evaluating its approach to mtDNA replacement therapies. In the United States, for example, an 
ad hoc committee of the Institute of Medicine is currently undertaking a project entitled «Ethical and 
Social Policy considerations of Novel Techniques for Prevention of Maternal Transmission of Mito-
chondrial DNA Diseases». The project is sponsored by the Food and Drug Administration and is ex-
pected to report some time in 201625. 
3. The UK Position 
In February 2015, the United Kingdom became the first country to legislate to permit – under careful 
regulation by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority – mtDNA replacement. Interestingly, 
given the controversial nature of the subject, the votes in both Houses of Parliament were not as 
close as might have been anticipated. In the House of Commons (the elected House), the voting was 
328 in favour to 128 against; in the House of Lords, the vote recorded was 280 in favour, with 48 op-
posed26. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015 will 
come into effect on 29 October 2015. Under the present legislation (the Human Fertilisation and Em-
bryology Act 1990, as amended in 2008), no licence could be issued to perform mitochondrial dona-
tion. However, following the passing of these regulations, it will now be possible for such procedures 
to be carried out, provided that the HFEA determines that there is a risk that a particular woman may 
have mitochondrial abnormalities in her eggs (where the technique contemplated is maternal spindle 
transfer). Where pronuclear transfer is contemplated, a similar finding has to be made in respect of 
the embryo. Finally, as the Explanatory Note to the regulations states, «[t]he HFEA must also be satis-
fied that there is a significant risk that a person with these abnormalities will have or develop serious 
mitochondrial disease». 
                                                          
22
 Report of the IBC on Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis and Germ-line Intervention, (SHS-2003/WS/26), 
Para 97 (2003). 
23
 Para 81. 
24
 A.L. BREDENOORD et al., op. cit., at p. 100. 
25
 See http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=49648 (accessed on 27/04/2015). 
26
 See Z. KMIETOWICZ, UK becomes first country to allow mitochondrial donation, in BMJ, 2015,350, h1103. 
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It was explained earlier that questions as to genetic identity/parenthood have also concerned some 
commentators. In this respect, the Regulations make it clear that the donor is not legally related to 
any subsequent child, nor is the donor entitled in law to apply for a parental order in respect of that 
child. To further distinguish children born following mtDNA transfer and donors, the regulations 
modify the provisions of the 1990 Act (as amended) in respect of the obtaining of identifying infor-
mation about the donor. While the UK has adopted an approach that allows for the identification of 
gamete donors, the Regulations specifically permit children or donors only limited, non-identifying 
information, thus further emphasising the almost total lack of genetic relationship between child and 
donor. 
4. Conclusion 
The HFEA is widely regarded as an efficient and effective regulatory body and doubtless it will con-
tinue to regulate in this novel area with its customary diligence. Meantime, research will continue in 
order to evaluate the safety and efficacy of each of the proposed methods to effect the eradication 
of mitochondrial disease through the generations. For individuals who risk having children suffering 
from such conditions, and who wish to have a child genetically related to them, this is surely prefera-
ble to the options currently available, which include remaining childless or undergoing IVF with pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis. 
Without being overly optimistic, it is certainly plausible that if any residual safety and efficacy con-
cerns can be removed by further research «hundreds of genetic diseases might be eliminated from 
families»27. And it is here that we see one critical reason why germ-line therapy might, in fact, be 
preferable to somatic therapy, at least in these cases. Simply put, rather than waiting to treat gener-
ation after generation for recurring problems, at a stroke they can be eradicated. Further, for some, 
the question is not so much whether we should use such therapeutic options; rather, this is an «ideal 
that medicine is obligated to pursue»28. Murdoch further argues that «[l]ike PGD, preventing mito-
chondrial DNA disease falls within the good medical practice of preventing serious illness, not eugen-
ics»29. 
This short discussion has attempted to evaluate some of the issues surrounding mtDNA donation and 
transfer, and has briefly explored the radical changes recently made in the United Kingdom. While 
the UK position is currently unique, doubtless it will be watched with some interest by other coun-
tries primed to tackle this complex subject. While it may never be possible entirely to convince 
doubters of the ethical probity of mtDNA transfer, even if safety and efficacy can be reliably assured, 
it can be argued that – while free to continue to express their concerns – their views cannot, and ar-
guably should not, pre-empt the interests and rights of those who are willing to support what may 
turn out to be another “medical miracle”; the avoidance of the predictable suffering of future gener-
ations and the emotional pain for potential parents. 
                                                          
27
 R. MUNSON, L.H. DAVIS, Germ-Line gene Therapy and the Medical Imperative, in Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
Journal, 1992, 2(2), 137-158, at p. 139. 
28
 R. MUNSON, L.H. DAVIS, op. cit., at p. 155. 
29
 A. MURDOCH, op. cit. 
